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ABSTRACT
During the recent economic downturn, payday lenders' business and
profits have soared while traditional banks have tightened up their lend-
ing practices and experienced plummeting stock values. Payday lenders
thrive in depressed economic climates. They do so by making short term,
high interest loans to the underclass, generally the poor in urban and im-
migrant communities who need money to meet basic needs and who are
without the sophistication to properly assess the risks of payday loans.
Members of the underclass, therefore, are especially vulnerable to and
ideal targets for predatory practices and exploitive loans. As the under-
class-almost by definition-do not have the resources to pay back pay-
day loans, they must "rollover" the loans and eventually owe
exponentially more than the terms of their original loan. In effect, pay-
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day loans enrich lenders while perpetuating the limited economic and so-
cial position of the underclass.
As a result, the payday lending industry must be regulated. This Note
argues that the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
which formally ended slavery, is the proper vehicle for Congress to im-
pose federal usury caps on payday loans. In order to make this case, this
Note provides an overview of payday lending practices, describes the un-
derclass, discusses the Thirteenth Amendment-including its ratification,
judicial history, and modern development-and applies the Thirteenth
Amendment to payday lending and the underclass.
Much has been written on the subject of payday lending practices, no-
tably Professor Nathalie Martin's work on the predatory nature of pay-
day lenders. Yet, the Thirteenth Amendment implications of payday
lending have not been addressed and little has been done to address the
conditions faced by the underclass. This Note makes clear that the Thir-
teenth Amendment is triggered by payday lenders' targeting of a vulnera-
ble social and economic people and that the Amendment provides an
appropriate avenue for regulating this particular industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Visit the Predatory Lending Association (PLA) website and one can
view its motto: "Helping payday lenders extract maximum profit from the
working poor."' The site helps users identify the working poor and ex-
plains how the "debt trap" of the working poor may be optimized.'
While the PLA's website parodies the predatory nature of payday lend-
ers, the humor is unfortunately rooted in the truth.
Payday loans are "small, short-term, triple-digit interest rate" loans
that usually range from $200 to $500 dollars. These loans are generally
secured by the borrower's post-dated check or debit authorization and
are intended to sustain the borrower until payday, when they will pay
back the loan in one lump sum on receipt of their paycheck.' As of
March 2010, "more than 19 million U.S. households had taken out pay-
day loans worth more than $35 billion."' A payday lender's business plan
is to build a base of customers who borrow frequently in order to keep up
1. PREDATORY LENDINo AsS'N, http://www.predatorylendingassociation.com (last
visited June 25, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 Aiuz. L. Riv. 563, 564 (2010).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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with their loan payments.' Payday lenders target people who they be-
lieve will have trouble paying off their debt and thus will be repeat
customers.
Take for example Sandra Harris, who borrowed $2,510 in separate
loans from a payday lender and ultimately paid $10,000 in fees.' Ms. Har-
ris said that while it was fast and easy to take out the loan, no one told
her "about the bad side . . . [b]ecause they wanted you to come back,
that's how they made their money."' Five years after Ms. Harris first
went to see a credit counselor she had only one $300 loan to pay off.1 o
That $300 loan cost her $1,200 per year in interest.u Ms. Harris is the
type of person that the PLA facetiously encourages other payday lenders
to target; as an African-American woman suffering tough economic
times, she is certainly the demographic that payday lenders actually tar-
get. Payday lenders disproportionately target minorities1 2 and those on
the "fringes of the financial system."' The PLA's parody demonstrates
what payday lenders are covertly and coercively doing, and in doing so,
the PLA exposes the predatory design of payday lenders.
The payday loan industry thrives at the expense of millions of under-
class Americans, who are generally defined as those who are economi-
cally impoverished and without the means to escape their economic
condition, which includes minorities who have been hit the hardest by the
current depressed economic climate. 4 In 2011, the stocks of payday
lenders soared to record highs as stocks in large banks plummeted." The
anemic economic growth in the United States, banks' increasing unwill-
ingness to lend money, and the lack of regulations on payday loans have
allowed the industry to thrive. These loans trap the borrower because
they are directly connected to the borrower's paycheck. The practice of
6. Id. at 577.
7. Id. at 573 (explaining the importance of repeat customers).
8. Rebecca Leung, Paying More for Payday Loans, CBS Ni-ws, Feb. 11, 2009, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/16/601 1/main695461.shtml.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Michael A Satz, How The Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Na-
ture of the Payday Loan Industry and Its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discrimi-
natory Lending Practices, 20 TEMP. Poi. & Civ. Rrs. L. Rev. 123, 138 (2010).
13. Lynn Cowan & Isabel Ordonez, Short-Term Lenders Seize the Day, WAuL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020365880457663943t6249885
72.html?KEYWORDS=payday+1ender.
14. See generally Darwinder S. Sidhu, Article, A Constitutional Remedy for Urban
Poverty, 61 DEPAui L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 6) (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice) (describing the urban
underclass).
15. Cowan, supra note 13.
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payday lending and its success in keeping the economically disadvantaged
mired in a cycle of poverty raises serious questions under the Thirteenth
Amendment, which formally banned slavery, and which applies to mod-
ern circumstances sufficiently resembling slavery. Are payday borrowers
the modern day peon whose labor is tied directly to paying off a deceitful
and excessive loan? Do these loans take advantage of, and promote the
residual badges and incidents of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment
sought to eliminate in society?
This Note discusses the Thirteenth Amendment implications found in
payday loans and argues that the Thirteenth Amendment is a proper fed-
eral path through which to regulate payday lenders. Specifically Part II
discusses Thirteenth Amendment history, scholarship, and court interpre-
tations of peonage. Part III reviews payday lending by examining who
typically takes out these loans, what the conditions of the loans generally
are, and evidence as to how these loans affect the borrowers. This section
also discusses the coercive techniques payday lenders use to rope borrow-
ers into abusive loans. Finally, Part IV analyzes how conditions of pay-
day loans trigger Thirteenth Amendment concerns. Part IV argues that
by looking at the structure of the loan itself, its organization around a
person's paycheck, its direct relationship with a person's labor, and the
lender's coercive means to compel a borrower to take out additional
loans, the Thirteenth Amendment is implicated. The targeted victims of
payday lending, particularly the underclass,' are proper recipients of
Thirteenth Amendment relief, as they are suffering the precise effects of
involuntary servitude that the Amendment was designed to eliminate.
To be sure, there will be many who disagree with the comparison of
payday borrowers to antebellum slaves. I do not argue that these bor-
rowers are subjected to the same racially infused servitude, hate, vio-
lence, and abuse. However, I do argue that the free labor concepts that
drove the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification apply, and that the type
of contract that payday lenders rope borrowers into is like that of the
peonage contracts that are already acknowledged to fall within the
bounds of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibitions. Payday debtors,
because of the type of loan that suppresses their free labor, suffer from
the badges and incidents of slavery that the 38th Congress-which en-
acted the Thirteenth Amendment-and subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions sought to eliminate. Today's underclass suffers from social and
economic conditions that restrict their social and physical mobility, and
constrain their economic options and life decisions." These are condi-
tions the Thirteenth Amendment aimed to prevent. While initially
16. See generally Sidhu, supra note 14 (describing the urban underclass).
17. See generally id. (describing the urban underclass).
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passed to end African Slavery in this country, the Thirteenth Amendment
is relevant today, as the conditions poor people face do not allow them to
be meaningfully free."
II. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND AND SCHOLARSHIP
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
A. Thirteenth Amendment History and Judicial Development
Enacted in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited the institution
of chattel slavery in the United States.20 The framers of the Amendment
did not utilize specific language to narrow its scope to African-American
ex-slaves.m Consequently, the Amendment protects "anyone regardless
of race or their relationship to nineteenth-century slavery; the remnants
of slavery as encountered by anyone regardless of race or their relation-
ship to nineteenth-century slavery; or any discrimination, humiliation, or
subjugation as to anyone."2 2 As the Supreme Court held, "While the im-
mediate concern [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was with African slav-
ery, the Amendment was not limited to that . .. [i]t was a charter of
18. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv,
713, 717-18 (1985) (arguing the need for a new test, other than the one in Carotene's Prod-
ucts, to protect groups' rights in today's political and social conditions), He writes:
[I]f we fail to rethink Carotene's dictum about discrete and insular minorities, we will
succeed only in doing two different kinds of damage. On the one hand, we will fail to
do justice to the very racial and religious groups that Carotene has done so much to
protect in the past half-century. By tying their rights to an increasingly unrealistic
model of politics, we will place them on the weakest possible foundation. On the
other hand, we will fail to do justice to Carotene's basic insight into the problem posed
by prejudice in a pluralist democracy. The end of politics of exclusion hardly implies
that pluralist democracy now functions fairly; it does mean, however, that the groups
most disadvantaged by pluralism in the future will be different from those excluded
under the old regime. The victims of sexual discrimination or poverty, rather than
racial or religious minorities, will increasingly constitute the groups with the greatest
claim under Carotene's concern with the fairness of pluralist process.
Id.
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. X1II.
20. Id.
21. See generally Sidhu, supra note 14 (manuscript at 3).
22. See generally id. at 16-17.
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universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color, or estate,
under the flag."2 3
In addition to the text, the intent of Congress was to expand the
Amendment to non-Blacks. In 1865, Congress was committed to ridding
the country of slavery and to promoting free labor in which all people
were entitled to enjoy the fruits of their own labor.24 This commitment
encompassed both Blacks and Whites, as Congress recognized that
Southern slavery had decreased workers' wages and had stigmatized agri-
cultural and hard labor.2 5 Senator H. Wilson, addressing Congress during
the Thirteenth Amendment debates, stated:
[tihis gigantic crime against the peace, the unity, and the life of the
nation is to make eternal the hateful dominion of man over the souls
and bodies of his fellow men. Those sacrifices of property, of health,
and of life, these appalling sorrows and agonies now upon us, are all
the merciless inflictions of slavery . . .. Yes, slavery is the conspirator
that conceived and organized this mighty conspiracy against the
unity and existence of the Republic . . . .26
23. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,240-41 (1911); see also Margaret Howard, Bank-
ruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. lu.. L. REv. 191, 208 (arguing that Bailey and Clyatt v. United
States "clearly disconnectied] the Thirteenth Amendment from its racial roots, at least as
far as peonage is concerned.").
24. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Re-
constructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FoRDHAM L. RtIv. 981, 1009 (2002).
25. William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAvis L. Re'v. 1311, 1357 (2007). Representative
Ingersoll of Illinois stated as a reason for supporting the Amendment, "for the sake of the
seven millions of poor [W]hite people who live in the slave States but who have ever been
deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of this trice-accursed institution of slavery.
Slavery has kept them in ignorance, in poverty, and in degradation." CONG. Gi.ons, 38I
CONG., IsT Shss. 2990 (1864). Senator Wilson further stated, "Then the wronged victim of
the slave system, the poor [Wjhite man, the sand-hiller, the clay-eater of the wasted fields
of Caroline, impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a badge of
disgrace, and the instruction of the brain and soul of man a crime, will lift his abashed
forehead to the skies and begin to run the race of improvement, progress and elevation."
CONG. Gionie, 38TiH CONG., 1ST SESs. 1324 (1864).
26. CONG. GLon, 38im CONG., IsT SEss. 1320 (1864) (statement of Sen. H. Wilson).
Senator Wilson concluded his address to Congress stating:
Our country is now floating on the stormy waves of civil war. Darkness lowers and
tempests threaten. The waves are rising and foaming and breaking around us and
over us with engulfing fury. But amid the thick gloom, the star of duty casts its clear
radiance over the dark and troubled waters, making luminous our pathway. That duty
is, with every conception of the brain, every throb of the heart, every aspiration of the
soul, by thought, by work, and by deed to feel, to think, to speak, to act so as to
obliterate the last vestiges of slavery in America, subjugate rebel slave masters to the
authority of the nation, hold up the weary arm of our struggling Government, crowd
with heroic manhood the ranks of our armies that are bearing the destinies of the
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Senator Wilson pronounced that slavery was the only "foe our country
has on the globe . . . " and that "every word spoken, every line written,
every act performed, that keeps the breath of life in slavery for a mo-
ment, is against the existence of democratic institutions, against the dig-
nity of the toiling millions, against liberty, the peace, the honor, the
renown, and the life of the nation."2 7
Accordingly, the Thirteenth Amendment-passed to end immoral, ra-
cial slavery-was also passed with a broader view: that one should own
his own labor and be free.28 Thus, its passage prohibited "all repressive
conduct rationally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply ra-
cist labor practices." 2 9 When Senator Wilson and Representative Inger-
soll addressed to the 38th Congress that the "poor [W]hite man" was also
a victim of slavery, they recognized that poor people, regardless of their
race, suffered the effects of slavery-not just African Americans."o The
debates give us insight into the broader scope of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's vision. While the 38th Congress had yet to recognize that others
in the country were suffering from badges and incidents of slavery-
namely Native Americans 31 -the vision of the Thirteenth Amendment
was to prevent the involuntary servitude of all in the country, to whom-
ever was suffering from its conditions.32
country on the points of their glittering bayonets, and thus forever blast the last hope
of the rebel chiefs .... Then shall the waning star of the rebellion go down in eternal
night, and the star of peace shall ascend the heavens, casting its mild radiance over
fields now darkened by the storms of this fratricidal war .. .. Then the star of United
America, now obscured, will reappear, radiant with splendor on the forehead of the
skies, to illume the pathway and gladden the heart of struggling humanity.
Id. at 1324.
27. Id. at 1324.
28. See Azmy, supra note 24 (recognizing a free labor system in which all people could
enjoy the "fruits of their own labor").
29. Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rrv. 307, 389 (2004).
30. CONG. Gi-oBE, 38ni CONG., 1sr Svuss. 2990, 1324 (1864) (statement of Sen. H.
Wilson).
31. Rodney M. Baine, Indian Slavery in Colonial Georgia, 79 GA. His-r. Q. 418, 418
(1995) (pointing out that Indian slavery has largely been ignored by historians).
32. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872).
If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to
make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which properly and
necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply,
though the party interested may not be of African descent. But what we do say, and
what we do with to be understood is, that in any fair and just construction of any
section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we
have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to
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B. Peonage-The Work Contracts that Broke the Debtor's Bank
Subsequent statutes, stemming from the Thirteenth Amendment, made
peonage unconstitutional." Prior to the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment and these statutes, peonage was the subject of a seminal
New Mexico case, Jaremillo v. Romero. 4 The case concerned, Mariana
Jaremillo, a servant whose father took her away from the service of her
master while she still owed $51.75 that her master previously advanced."
Mariana did not appear at trial, and was rendered a judgment for twenty-
six months of work, or for the amount she owed, interest, and all costs. 6
The district court held that Mariana owed her employer, Romero, the
securities on her appeal bond, the sum of $56.21, and the costs of the suit
to be taxed. Furthermore, in default of the payment that she owed, she
had to serve her master as a peon until debt was paid."
Ultimately the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico re-
versed the judgment of the lower court with costs to Romero for a lack of
evidence of debt owed." The court defined "peon" and "peonage" as
people indebted to their masters.4 o
This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their masters' ser-
vice . . . . Upon entering the new service, or while continuing
therein, the peon was held rigorously to fulfill his pledge and render
remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose
was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.
Id.
33. U.S. CONs r. amend. XIII, § 1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (outlawing peon-
age and any method utilized to bind someone to voluntary or involuntary servitude).
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all
acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any at-
tempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly,
the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of
any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1596 (2006) (setting out the law regarding peonage by
criminalizing peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons).
34. 1 N.M. 190 (1857).
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 9 (noting that the requisitorial letters had no legal force as evidence of
Mariana's debt to Romero).
40. See id. at 2 (describing peons also as coming from no particular race, color, cast, or
origin, and as owning little or no personal property).
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his labor so long as his debts remained, or an additional one was
incurred.'
The characteristic that separated peonage from slavery was that
"[clonsent of the parties was invariably the foundation upon which a ser-
vant became bound to service. "42 Peons could leave their service by pay-
ing back the debt to the master, or by working it off.43 A person in the
condition of peonage lost:
[n]one of his rights as a citizen by contracting with a master to serve
him. He [was] under no political disqualifications; he [voted] at all
elections if otherwise legally qualified; his servitude [did] not render
him under our laws ineligible to the offices of the precinct, the coun-
try, the legislature or delegate in congress.44
In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court opined on the unconstitutionality of
peonage under the strictures of the Thirteenth Amendment in Bailey v.
Alabama.4 5 There, Bailey was convicted under an Alabama statute for
obtaining fifteen dollars under a written contract with intent to injure or
defraud his employer.46 Bailey borrowed fifteen dollars and agreed to
41. Id.
42. See id. at 3 (asserting that the principle of peonage had its roots in Spanish law,
which later spread to Mexico).
43. Id. at 8 (establishing that peonage was a contract between a master and servant,
and that the servant could not leave the master's service during the time specified in said
contract except by repaying the master or working off his debts).
44. Id.
45. See 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (addressing the U.S. Supreme Court's contention that
peonage is a violation of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment).
The plain intention [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to abolish slavery of whatever
name and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of
bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service
of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of
involuntary servitude.
Id.
46. Id. at 229. Bailey "entered into the written contract to perform labor or services
for the Riverside Company, a corporation, and obtained the sum of $15 . . . and afterwards
with like intent, and without just cause failed or refused to perform such labor or services
or to refund such money . . . ." Id. The manager of Riverside Company testified that
Bailey worked for only a month and a few days before ceasing further performance on the
contract; this was the only evidence offered by the state. Id. at 230. The jury instruction
submitted by the state indicated that refusing to perform under the contract without just
cause was prima facie evidence "of the intent to injure his employer, or to defraud him."
Id. The court accepted this instruction over Bailey's objection and a jury found him guilty.
Id. at 231. In addition to awarding the injured party fifteen dollars in damages and another
thirty dollars in fines, it was ordered that if Bailey defaulted on this payment he would be
required to perform twenty days hard labor to cover the fine, and one hundred and sixteen
days to cover the costs. Id.
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spend a year working off the debt.4 7 The Court found that although in
the system of peonage the debtor contracted to perform the labor, this
did not legalize the state's attempt to enforce the contract.4 8 In fact, the
Court held the contract to be unconstitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment and it did not matter whether the debtor voluntarily or in-
voluntarily entered into a peonage loan. 4 9 The Bailey Court found that,
whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily, the classification of the
loan:
implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the
character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor volunta-
rily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced
upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage, however
created is compulsory service, involuntary servitude.50
It was not the employment contract that was found unconstitutional,
rather the type of contract that prevented a person from enjoying the
fruits of their labor 5 1-a coercive contract. The contract was tied to the
47. Id. Specifically, the contract stated that in exchange for the $15 Bailey agreed to
"work and labor" for Riverside Company as a farm hand on one of their Montgomery
county farms. Id. The contract began December 30, 1907 and ended December 30, 1908
for which he was to be paid $12 per month to apply towards the debt. Id. at 229-30.
48. Id. at 242. The term peonage comes from Spanish America where it was used to
describe the practice of compulsory service in order to pay off a debt. Id. When the Thir-
teenth Amendment was passed, Congress "was not concerned with mere names ... It was
concerned with . .. a condition, however named and wherever it might be established,
maintained or enforced." Id. Similarly, the amendment would serve little purpose if
"through the guise of contracts" a debtor was "held to compulsory service." Id.
49. Id. at 245.
50. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). While a peon may earn his release by paying off the
debt, his service is enforced until such time as the debt is paid. Id. The difference between
peonage and the voluntary performance of labor in payment of a debt is clear in that a
voluntary laborer can elect at anytime to break his contract and be subject to a breach
action for damages, but will not be subject to a law that compels performance or service.
Id. Congress specifically sought to nullify all state laws that attempted to compel service or
labor by making it a crime to refuse to perform. Id. at 243-44. "The Thirteenth Amend-
ment prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime," but that prohibition
does not permit states to establish involuntary servitude "by making it a crime to refuse to
submit to the one or to render the service which would constitute the other." Id. at 244.
Essentially, while a state may order a man to labor as a criminal punishment, it may not
order him to labor for another as criminal punishment for failing to perform or pay. Id.
51. JoHN LoCKE, THiE SFCOND TiATriSE OF GOVERNMEN §§ 23, 27 (Drover Thrift
ed., Courier Dover Publications 2002) (1690). Locke was instrumental in the Framers'
construction of this concept. Locke wrote, "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be
common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are
properly his." Id. § 27. On Slavery Locke wrote, "The freedom from absolute, arbitrary
power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part
72 [Vol. 15:63
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debtor's labor; this was unconstitutional. The employer-employee rela-
tionship was not at issue.
Justice Field's dissent in the Slaughter House Cases further synthesized
the right to control one's labor with the Thirteenth Amendment. 5 2 JUS-
tice Field wrote that the Thirteenth Amendment should prevent peonage
and any other form of "compulsory service for the mere benefit or plea-
sure of others."53 He concluded that involuntary servitude manifested
itself into the effects of the type of one's labor, stating:
[the Thirteenth Amendment] was intended to make every one born
in this country a freeman, and as such to give to him the right to
pursue the ordinary avocations of life without other restraint than
such as affects all others, and to enjoy equally with them the fruits of
his labor. A prohibition to him to pursue certain callings, open to
others of the same age, condition, and sex, or to reside in places
where others are permitted to live, would so far deprive him of the
rights of a freeman, and would place him, as respects others, in a
condition of servitude.5 4
Furthermore, Justice Field pronounced that any compulsion that would
force one into labor, even for his own benefit "only in one direction or in
one place" would be nearly as oppressive as the "compulsion that would
with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together; for a man, not having the
power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one,
nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life when
he pleases. ." Id. § 23.
52. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83-91 (1872).
53. Id. at 89-90. The plaintiffs contended that:
[W]herever a law of a State, or a law of the United States, makes a discrimination
between classes of persons, which deprives the one class of their freedom or their
property, or which makes a caste of them to subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity,
or vengeance of others, there involuntary servitude exists within the meaning of the
[T]hirteenth (Almendment.
Id at 91.
54. Id. at 90. The Thirteenth Amendment was passed by Congress on December 18,
1865, and the Civil Rights Act passed shortly on its heels in April 1866, were designed to
give citizens of any "race and color"-regardless of their background-the same basic free-
doms enjoyed by White Americans. Id. at 91. The driving theory was that all citizens
should be "entitled to the rights and privileges enumerated" and denying or subjugating
those rights in any manner was to subject a citizen to a form of involuntary servitude. Id.
at 91-92. The drafter of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Trumball declared to the Congress
"I take it that any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil
rights, which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and
it is in fact a badge of servitude which by the Constitution is prohibited." Id. at 92. Justice
Field's dissent was based on the idea that a state law that opened industry to some, while
closing it off to others, was a clear violation of the spirit of both the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 93.
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force him to labor for the benefit or pleasure of another, and would
equally constitute an element of servitude."" Following Justice Field's
line of reasoning, it matters not why someone enters into the oppressive
contract, but only that one is forced by their social conditions into invol-
untary servitude.
The Supreme Court also wrote about the cyclical debt that is inherent
in peonage. In United States v. Reynolds,16 G.W. Broughton acted as
surety for two convicts by paying their court fines and contracting them
to work in order to pay off the debt." One of the convicts was charged
with violating a labor contract to work off debt to another creditor. 8 The
Court found that the labor contracts created by surety were harsher than
the labor requirements of the state to repay the fines." While the con-
victs were technically being punished for their crime as allowed by the
express terms of the Thirteenth Amendment,6 0 the terms of their labor
55. Id. at 90. Justice Field wrote that the effect of the act was that in an area measur-
ing 1,100 square miles, a population of over 200,000 people would be compelled by opera-
tion of law to use the "buildings of the favored company" for slaughtering their animals or
stabling their horses. Id. at 92. In addition, they would have to pay these companies for
the privilege of using their grounds, even though they are using them under compulsion,
and would have to leave a portion of any animal slaughtered. Id. They were not even
permitted to undertake these actions on their own land, resulting in restrictions so "odious
in character" that they were reminiscent of 17th century France before the peasants re-
volted against the nobles for the severe oppression forced upon them. Id. at 92-93.
56. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 140 (1942).
57. Id. Ed Rivers was convicted of petit larceny and was ordered to pay a total of
$58.75 in fines and costs. Id. at 139. Reynolds paid the sum to the court as surety for
Rivers and the two entered into a contract requiring Rivers to work as a farm hand earning
$6 a month until the amount was paid off. Id. at 139-140. When Rivers was convicted
again for refusing to labor any longer for Reynolds, Broughton acted as surety for that
court ordered sum, allowing Rivers to contract once again as a farm hand. Id. at 140. The
second person was E.W. Fields, charged with selling mortgaged property and ordered to
pay a total of $119.70 to the court. Id. Broughton paid the total and contracted Fields to
work as a farm and logging hand for a little under two years until the debt was paid in full.
Id.
58. Id. Under Rivers' first contract with Reynolds he contracted to work nine months
and twenty-four days. Id. He worked from May 4, 1910 through June 6, 1910, until he
refused to work for Reynolds any further. Id. He was subsequently arrested for "violating
the contract of service" and fined $87.06. Id. After that he contracted to work for
Broughton-who covered his fines and costs-for a period of fourteen months and fifteen
days. Id.
59. Id. at 147. Under Alabama law the maximum sentence Ed Rivers would have
been ordered to pay off his costs and fines was sixty-eight days hard labor. Id. Fields
would have been facing a maximum of not more than four months of hard labor. Id.
60. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. CONsi. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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contract were not fixed by the state." The convicts were working under
constant coercion and threat of arrest, thus the system was found to be in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 2 The Court wrote, "The con-
vict is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude to dis-
charge the obligation which he [hias incurred to his surety, who has
entered into an undertaking with the state, or paid money in his
behalf."63
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Mussry64 suggested that due to modern economic realities, the slaves that
were the original concern of the Thirteenth Amendment are today's mi-
grant workers and domestic servants, and that the methods of coercion
have become more subtle yet equally effective. 5 Accordingly, the court
held that psychological coercion of workers is a form of threat ad-
61. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 147. In both cases the men were subjected to sentences that
far exceeded what they would have faced had their labor contracts been created by the
state. Id. In fact, in a number of Alabama cases the "hirer becomes the transferee of the
right of the state to compel the payment of the fine and costs, and by this exaction of
involuntary servitude the convict has only changed masters," and this practice is not con-
sidered illegal because the convict "is not being imprisoned for indebtedness." Id. at 148.
The result is that the only connection between Alabama's Thirteenth Amendment right to
order labor as punishment for a crime, and the surety's agreement with a convict is that it
allows the practice and charges the convict if he breaches it. Id.
62. Id. at 146-47.
Under this statute, the surety may cause the arrest of the convict for violation of his
labor contract. He may be sentenced and punished for this new offense, and under-
take to liquidate the penalty by a new contract of a similar nature, and, if again bro-
ken, may be prosecuted ... The rearrest of which we have spoken is not because of his
failure to pay his fine and costs originally assessed against him by the state. He is
arrested at the instance of the surety, and because the law punishes the violation of the
contract which the convict has made with him.
Id.
63. Id.
64. 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated by United States v. Kozminski, 487
U.S. 931 (1988).
65. Id. The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment and the statutes passed to help
enforce its objectives apply to more than just the traditional form of slavery. Id. The
statutes and amendment were intended to bring an end to slavery in its classic form and
any other form of involuntary servitude, creating a free labor system throughout the coun-
try. Id. At all times the laborer must be free to move on to other income sources when he
sees fit; without the ability to leave there is little incentive for the employer to treat the
worker properly. Id. See also Ragini Tripathi, Comment, The H-2B Visa: Is This How We
Treat a Guest?, 11 SCo1AR 519, 533 (2009) (analyzing the plight of guest workers in the
United States and how the visa system subjects them to involuntary servitude). "The plight
of guest workers has been referred to as a form of contract slavery" and is commonly
considered "one of the most prevalent forms of modern slavery." Id.
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dressable under the Thirteenth Amendment.6 6  More specifically, in
Mussry, the defendants led their Indonesian servants to believe they had
to work in order to repay the defendants for money spent on their travel
to the United States.' The defendants took advantage of the fact that
their Indonesian servants were "in a strange country where they had no
friends, and had nowhere to go, did not speak English, had no work per-
mit, social security card, or identification, no passport or return airline
ticket. . . " and therefore, "no means by which to seek other employment,
and with insufficient funds to break their contracts . ."68 There the
court held:
[c]onduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law or physical
force may, under some circumstances, have the same effect as the
more traditional forms of coercion-or may even be more coercive;
such conduct, therefore, may violate the 13th amendment and its en-
forcing statutes. The crucial factor is whether a person intends to and
does coerce an individual into his service by subjugating the will of the
other person. A holding in involuntary servitude occurs when an in-
dividual coerces another into his service by improper or wrongful
conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person
to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform the
labor.6 9
66. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453. "Conduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law
or physical force may, under some circumstances, have the same effect as the more tradi-
tional forms of coercion-or may even be more coercive, such conduct, therefore, may
violate the [Thirteenth] Amendment and its enforcing statutes." Id. The real measure is
whether the person intended to and actually did coerce another into service by subjugating
his will. Id. The person must be made to believe that there is no other "alternative but to
perform the labor." Id.
67. Id. The Indonesian servants were forced to surrender passports and plane tickets
until they could work to pay back the "costs of their transportation to the United States."
Id. The servants spoke little English, had no friends or family to rely on for support, lacked
the legal documents necessary to work, and therefore had no other alternative but to per-
form the labor. Id.
68. Id. While the servants were paid a much higher wage than they received in their
home country, they were still paid significantly below the required minimum wage. Id.
However, just because someone was coerced to accept lower wages based on truthful rep-
resentations does not mean a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment has occurred. Id.
"It is the act of the employer, as well as the effect upon the worker, that the 13th amend-
ment and its enforcing statutes address." Id. See also Tripathi,supra note 65, at 532 (ana-
lyzing the plight of guest workers in the United States and how the visa system subjects
them to involuntary servitude).
69. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
In determining the question of involuntariness, the court should consider whether the
challenged conduct would have had the claimed effect upon a reasonable person of the
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The Mussry test therefore finds a sufficient showing of psychological
coercion to prove involuntary servitude, even in the absence of physical
or threatening force.o
The early cases addressing peonage, whether voluntary or involuntary,
all have a common denominator: labor contracts restricting an individ-
ual's free exercise of labor and economic independence.7 1 Professor
Baher Azmy wrote of the peonage cases discussed above, contending
"[t]hat the cases nevertheless advanced a central concern of the Thir-
teenth Amendment framers: protecting the mobility of labor and mean-
ingful opportunities for economic independence." 72 In Professor Azmy's
analysis of Bailey v. Alabama he wrote:
[Tihe Court was advancing a central Republican insistence that men
be able to enjoy the 'fruits of their own labor.' This distinctive liber-
tarian vision required that labor be mobile, and untethered to abso-
lute control of another private person and that men must have the
right to control basic life choices, including when and for whom they
work. In such a free system, Republicans believed that men could
partake in the continuing, natural process of progressing toward eco-
nomic independence and social improvement.
Modern day Thirteenth Amendment scholarship calls for protection of
all people from arbitrary restraints of freedom. 74 Freedom of labor aside,
Thirteenth Amendment expert Professor Alexander Tsesis argues that
the Amendment should protect free people's "conceptions of, and quests
for, qualitatively good lives."75 Under this standard, peonage suppresses
"life aspirations [by] prohibiting [debtors] from entering into marital con-
tracts, from choosing professions, and from making a host of other impor-
tant life decisions. "76 In his call for modern Thirteenth Amendment
litigation and legislation, Professor Tsesis writes "[p]rotecting essential
freedoms means ending coercive practices and enabling people to make
reasonable choices . . .. Using the Thirteenth Amendment for that end
same general background and experience. Thus, the particular individual's background
is relevant in deciding whether he or she was coerced into laboring for the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. James Henry Haag, Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-Century Concept in
Search of a Twentieth- Century Definition, 19 PAc. L.J. 873, 892 (1988). The test even
extends to threats of legal action made against the victim in an attempt to keep them from
breaching the contract. Id.
71. Azmy, supra note 24, at 986.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1031.
74. Tsesis, supra note 29.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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would be a legitimate use of governmental power to provide for the com-
mon good."7 7
C. The Badges of Slavery Apply Even Without Slavery
The state of peonage was considered a symptom of slavery, but cer-
tainly was not the only symptom. In Bailey the Court stated that the
plain intention of the Thirteenth Amendment was to:
[Albolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and
incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor
free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one
man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit, which is the es-
sence of involuntary servitude.
The Bailey court thus recognized that the symptoms of slavery still ex-
isted, and that these symptoms, called the "badges and incidents" of slav-
ery, were unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment.79
The Supreme Court in The Civil Rights Cases elaborated on the rela-
tionship between badges and incidents of slavery and the Thirteenth
Amendment:
It may be that by the black code . . . in the times when slavery pre-
vailed, the proprietors of inns and public conveyances were forbid-
den to receive persons of the African race, because it .. . was merely
a means of preventing . .. escapes, and was no part of the servitude
itself .... The long existence of African slavery in this country gave
us very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary
incidents. Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the
master, restraint of his movements except by the master's will, disa-
bility to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in
court, to be a witness against a [Wihite person, and such like burdens
and incapacities were the inseparable incidents of the institution.
Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the slave than on
free persons guilty of the same offenses."o
The Court in Jones expanded on this concept, reversing a district
court's dismissal of a complaint brought by plaintiffs who were not al-
lowed to buy a home because of their race."1 The Court explained that
77. Id.
78. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (emphasis added).
79. Id. "[L]egislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and
circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its viola-
tion in letter or spirit."
80. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1883).
81. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968).
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just as the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War had restricted the free
enjoyment of rights, so did the exclusion of African-Americans from
White communities. The Court continued, "[wihen racial discrimina-
tion herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn
on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery."83
Since Jones, the Court has indicated that it is Congress' responsibility
to interpret and give meaning to the "badges and incidents" of slavery. 8 4
The Court also has acknowledged that the Amendment's reach is much
broader than that of the other Reconstruction Amendments-the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments." Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has never ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment is limited only to the
conditions of literal slavery." Rather, actual slavery, as well as the
"badges and incidents" of slavery, or the legacies of slavery, are both pro-
hibited by the Thirteenth Amendment."
The question becomes, what reasonably constitutes a "badge or inci-
dent" of slavery? Professor Donald P. Judges argues that today's under-
class experience badges and incidents of slavery in their impoverished
economic and related social conditions, regardless of race, "joblessness,
crime, welfare dependency, drug addiction, inadequate health care and
broken families . . . ."I Conditions that are severe enough to form a
caste society thus are considered badges and incidents of slavery,89 espe-
cially when they promote a cycle of poverty, rendering the underclass
"chronically disadvantaged."9 o More specifically, these conditions are
manifested through "denial of freedom of movement, ability to own or
dispose of property, the right to make and enforce contracts . . . . "91
Furthermore, scholars have posited that "human trafficking, hate speech,
child abuse, violence against women, abortion, the citizenship of children
of immigrants, the autonomy of American workers, and U.S. corpora-
tions' use of exploited foreign laborers" are all encompassed by the Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of incidents of "involuntary
servitude." 92
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 442-43.
84. Carter, supra note 25, at 1327.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1328.
87. Id. at 1365.
88. Douglas P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Dis-
advantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HAsE INGS CONsr. L.Q. 599, 682 (1992).
89. Id. at 688-89.
90. Id. at 688.
91. Carter, supra note 25, at 1329.
92. See Sidhu, supra note 14 (manuscript at 3-4) (describing the lack of constitutional
protections afforded to those residing in urban areas). The Thirteenth Amendment has
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Economic independence is a priority of the Thirteenth Amendment's
goal to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, and is an essential
predicate for an inclusive, free democratic society.93 "Economic indepen-
dence is necessary if the citizen is to be able to deliberate on the common
good, the res publica, the thing public."94 The freedoms afforded under
the Thirteenth Amendment are threatened when citizens have failed to
be set free from economic dependence.95 Professor Amar argues that the
Thirteenth Amendment should be interpreted to "guarantee each Ameri-
can a certain minimum stake in society."96 This will help create indepen-
dent citizens who have economic opportunity, a voice in the political
arena, and who are not socially isolated-a central goal of the Thirteenth
Amendment.97 Professor Amar suggests that insurance of minimal enti-
tlements are a constitutional duty and the nation needs minimum birth-
rights for every individual." If you view the minimum stake in society as
a floor for minimum rights enjoyed by every individual in this country,
those below the floor will suffer from economic, political, and social isola-
tion which leaves them vulnerable to suffering the "badges and incidents
of slavery."99
III. CONDITIONS OF TAKING OUT A PAYDAY LOAN
The underclass' is the payday lender's most profitable customer base,
therefore, payday lenders market directly to members of the underclass
been interpreted to be extensive in scope. Id. at 4. The amendment covers circumstances
concerning racial profiling, limited opportunities in education, housing, and traveling. Id.
This category of protection correlates to a larger problem: the perpetual "urban under-
class," which triggers the requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id.
93. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 37, 38 (1990) (describing the deeply rooted
American tradition which the author refers to as the "R/republican tradition" and how it
has shaped American politics).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 40 (discussing the importance of different constitutional rights).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 40-42 (discussing the importance of being self-sufficient).
98. Id. at 43.
99. See generally Sidhu, supra note 14 (manuscript at 3-4) (describing the lack of con-
stitutional protections afforded to those residing in urban areas). The Thirteenth Amend-
ment established a floor of educational and economic conditions in order to give the urban
underclass their own liberty resulting in "minimally effective" individuals in our society.
Id. at 5.
100. The underclass exemplifies the Thirteenth Amendment problem with payday
lending, but Thirteenth Amendment relief may not necessarily be limited to the underclass.
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even if the loans are unaffordable.io' Affluent and sophisticated consum-
ers are less likely to make mistakes when shopping for loans because they
are better educated about financial products or they can hire experts to
help them."o2 Additionally, to the extent they make a mistake, they have
the financial ability to recover.' 03 By contrast, payday lenders design
products that exploit poorer consumers' mistakes.10 4 Lenders advertise
that payday loans are a fast and easy way to get a loan, especially for
those with "bad" credit.os The industry advertises via radio, television,
internet, and mail. 0 6 Moreover payday lenders will entice debtors to
take loans by offering free and promotional payday loans to first time
borrowers as well as referral fees to existing customers for referring new
customers.'07 The underclass "lack[s] the financial cushion that rich con-
sumers have, and therefore they are more vulnerable to the unexpected
costs of credit products and more likely to stumble into financial
distress."'
Furthermore, payday lenders disproportionately target minorities' 0 9
especially African-Americans and Hispanics,"o along with military mem-
bers and women."' Payday lenders target minority communities by
opening in poorer neighborhoods that are often comprised of a large
number of minorities." 2 The lenders even go so far as to develop busi-
ness plans to promote the targeting of minorities and welfare recipi-
ents."' It is well known that payday loans are "designed to extend credit
to borrowers who are denied access to traditional credit prod-
101. See generally Shane M. Mendenhall, Payday Loans: The Effects of Predatory
Lending on Society and the Need for More State and Federal Regulation, 32 OKILA. CITY U.
L. Rav. 299, 307-08 (2007) (explaining the advertising tactics used by predatory lenders).
102. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
64 (2008).
103. Id. Usually, more affluent customers are able to recover by paying off a credit
card bill or even refinancing a mortgage that contains more favorable terms. Id.
104. See id. (explaining how the vulnerability of poor consumers causes them to fall
into financial distress).
105. Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 307.
106. Id. at 306.
107. Martin, supra note 3, at 574.
108. Bar-Gill, supra note 102.
109. Satz, supra note 12.
110. Id.
111. Bar-Gill, supra note 102, at 68. "In Chicago, for example, 41% of the city's sub-
prime refinancing occurs in [B]Ilack neighborhoods, although only 10% of the overall refi-
nancing takes place in these same neighborhoods. An Illinois study found that there were
37% more payday loans issued in minority neighborhoods than in [W]hite neighborhoods."
Id.
112. Satz, supra note 12, Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 307.
113. Satz, supra note 12.
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ucts .. . [and] the broad exposure of minorities to payday loans and sub-
prime mortgages implies a broad exposure to the risks associated with
these products."1 14
In further taking advantage of the borrower, payday lenders are fully
aware that "many lower-income people are intimidated by banks.""'
Using this to their advantage, "friendly" payday lenders make customers
feel at home and accepted so that they are comfortable taking out initial
loans and then returning to borrow more.' 16 These practices suggest that
lenders are wolves in sheep's clothing. When the debtor's loan rolls over,
the borrower typically will end up paying $1800 for a $300 loan.117 Lend-
ers know that borrowers will pay any interest rate for fear of not making
other basic payments, such as for food or electricity." 8
Payday lenders characterize a payday loan as a short-term loan, yet the
loan is designed as interest-only so the "principal essentially stays out
forever, while the lender recoups the money he has loaned in only four
weeks.""' This distinguishes payday loans from other types of loans,
such as credit card loans or home mortgages, which are designed to pay
off the principal and the interest in installments.' 2 0 The typical payday
debtor finds it impossible to repay the principal balance by the end of the
loan period.' 2 ' This leads to a "rollover"-which occurs "when a cus-
tomer, unable to repay the full principal and unwilling to fall into default
if the payday lender attempts to cash her check, rolls the payday loan
114. Bar-Gill, supra note 102, at 68.
115. Martin, supra note 3, at 576.
116. Id. at 567.
117. Satz, supra note 12, at 132.
118. See Mendenhall, supra note 101 ("The assumption is that people with financial
difficulties in dire need of money will pay almost any interest rate to get it.").
119. Martin, supra note 3, at 564. "A typical short-term loan product in today's mar-
ket allows a customer to borrow $400, for fourteen days or less, for a $100 fee. The loan is
usually designed as an interest-only loan, with the interest payment-here $100-due
every two weeks." Id.
120. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 9892 MINN. L. Riev. 1110,
1158-59 (2008) (discussing how characterizing the APR of a payday loan as fees misleads
the borrower into thinking it is just as good, if not better than other types of loans).
"While focusing on a dollar amount might simplify comparison of one payday loan to an-
other payday loan, it confuses the more important price comparison to other types of debt
such as credit cards, pawnshop loans, home mortgages, and personal loans from finance
companies, banks, or credit unions." Id. See also Consumer Union of U.S., Payday Lend-
ers: Small Loans, Hefty Fees, Big Problem, CONSUMER REPOIs MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009,
available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/viewpoint/small-loan-big-
problems/overview/small-loan-big-trouble-ov.htm.
121. Satz, supra note 12, at 129.
82 [Vol. 15:63
PAYDAY PEONAGE
over for another pay cycle . . . ."122 Rollovers are the "bread and butter"
of the payday lending business.12 3
Payday loans are not necessarily related to a borrower's income. 12 4
While a credit report is not required to take out a payday loan, 2 s the
lenders do whatever they can to make sure they receive payments.12 6
The borrower is required to "enter into a bank debit agreement that en-
ables the lender to debit the rollover fee from her bank account every
two weeks."12 1 Moreover, it is becoming increasingly popular to have a
borrower authorize her employer to pay a lender directly from her
wages.128 These wage assignments ensure that the payday lender will re-
ceive its payment before the borrower is able to pay other bills, creating a
dependence on the payday lender to provide more loans,' proliferating
the borrower's cycle of debt.
There is a great deal of direct and indirect coercion in payday lending.
Discussing examples of such coercion, and even outright fraud, in preda-
tory lending, Professor Kathleen C. Engel and Professor Patricia A. Mc-
Coy wrote, "[lending fraud comes in endless varieties and is only limited
by the ingenuity of the perpetrators . . .. The first type of fraud consists
of deception aimed at borrowers."1 30 "The most notorious deceptions in-
clude fraudulent disclosures, failures to disclose information as required
by law, bait-and-switch tactics, and loans made in collusion with home-
repair scams."13
Coercion exists within the methods by which payday lenders character-
ize the annual percentage rate (APR). The APR is advertised to the bor-
rower as a fee for procuring the payday loan, but generally comes with
122. Id. at 130.
123. Martin, supra note 3, at 575.
124. See generally Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 305 (explaining that since lenders
know borrowers do not have sufficient funds in their bank accounts at the time the loan is
granted, they agree to wait until the borrower receives their paycheck to obtain payment);
Satz, supra note 12, at 128.
125. Satz, supra note 12, at 128.
126. See Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 314 (explaining the frequently unfair and
illegal collection practices of the payday lending industry).
127. Satz, supra note 12, at 132.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1255, 1267 (2002).
131. Id. at 1268. With regard to fraudulent deception "aimed at capital sources, such
as secondary-market purchasers of loans, federal loan guarantors, and sometimes even
loan originators themselves[,J" such fraud is commonly seen in "falsified loan applications
or inflated real estate appraisals." Id.
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additional features, trapping unwary consumers with inordinate fees.13 1
These "fees" are essentially a finance charge and when they are actually
expressed as an APR it is clear that the percentage rate is astronomically
higher. For example, a borrower who requests a $100 loan, writes a check
for $115, and receives a cash advance of $100; the $15 fee on that loan
translates to an APR of 390%.'" Depending on the transaction and the
jurisdiction, the APR for a payday loan can reach even higher, and range
up to 871%.1' The borrower will not realize that this fee is actually an
APR because lenders do everything they can to make sure the borrower
does not fully understand the implications of the fees. Payday lenders
profit enormously from this type of deception through APR fees.135
Professor Michael A. Satz identifies further deceptive practices payday
lenders employ to reel in borrowers. "Affinity marketing" schemes are
used to mislead customers into thinking that the loans offered are govern-
ment sanctioned.' 3 6 In addition, lenders encourage borrowers to "enter
alternative lending transactions that are designed to skirt, or even break,
the laws attempting to regulate the payday lending industry."'1 "These
alternative lending practices include the sale-leaseback transaction, the
cash-catalog sale and cash-back advertising."' 3 8
Finally, debt collection options that traditional debt collectors may not
use are available to payday lenders.13 1 Payday lenders will harass cus-
tomers and their employers and relatives with vexing telephone calls,
132. Patrick L. Hayes, A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lend-
ing Practices and Promoting Lower Cost Alternatives, 35 Wm. Mrrci niu. L. Reiv. 1134,
1142 (2009). In 1999, a survey by the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) revealed
lenders making "payday loans of $100 to $400 had interest rates of 390% to 871%." Id.
Furthermore, CFA found that in 2001 many lenders were charging more than 500% APR
for a fourteen-day loan of $100. Id.
133. Pearl Chin, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. I lu. L. Rlv.
723, 729 (2004). To illustrate the magnitude of these fees, "[tjhese rates are even higher
than those of organized crime loan sharks in Las Vegas, who traditionally have charged
about 5% interest per week, or 260% APR." Id.
134. Hayes, supra note 132.
135. Martin, supra note 3, at 570. An industry website proudly advertises the fact that
payday lending is extremely profitable, emphasizing the words "tremendous profits availa-
ble" in their summary. Id.
136. Satz, supra note 12, at 133. "For example, payday lenders regularly target mili-
tary personnel for their fringe banking products." Id. Lenders located near military bases
lure military customers with official looking advertisements in private publications targeted
to create the mistaken belief that the lenders are endorsed by the military. Id.
137. Id. at 134.
138. Id. "The sale-leaseback transaction is written up as though the lender buys an
appliance from the customer[,J" but while the lender leases the appliance back to the cus-
tomer for a fee, the lender doesn't take possession, just a post-dated check. Id. If the
customer defaults, the lender often will not accept the appliance to satisfy the debt. Id.
139. Id. at 135.
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threaten violence against customers unable to repay, collect excessive
damages from customers, and threaten criminal prosecution against cus-
tomers who fail to make payments. 140 Some criminal bad-check statutes
enable a payday lender to coerce borrowers into paying their debts to
avoid criminal prosecution.1 ' The analogy has been made that "payday
lenders use the threat of jail just as a loan shark might have used the
threat of physical violence."l 42 Some of the lenders file criminal com-
plaints in faraway jurisdictions, rendering it impossible for the borrower
to respond to the suit.1 43 Payday lenders may place a hold on a debtor's
checking account to enforce a payment.144 Complicated arbitration
agreements are now emerging in payday loan contracts, and "payday loan
companies rely on the in terrorem effect to dissuade consumers from
bringing lawsuits."' 4 5 Borrowers generally sign away any meaningful le-
gal redress available to them when executing many payday lenders'
agreements that include mandatory binding arbitration agreements. 1 6
When it comes to receiving their money, payday lenders emerge like
wolves, using coercive and frightening tactics to get their payments. As
this discussion makes clear, payday lenders engage in various conduct at
several stages-from marketing, issuing the loans, and collecting pay-
ment-that can be described as opportunistic or aggressive at best, and
coercive and predatory at worst.
IV. PAYDAY DEBT PEONAGE
Peonage stemming from payday lending is a legitimate Thirteenth
Amendment problem that should give rise to remedial action under this
140. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. RiV. 1, 78 (2002). The Community Financial Services Association of America
(CFSA) adopted a best practices list, under which members pledge to follow appropriate
collection practices. Id. at 77. For example, members "pledge to follow the best practice of
not threatening or seeking criminal action against customers who fail to repay loans." Id.
Nonetheless, the loan industry continues to use harassment techniques on consumers. Id.
141. Satz, supra note 12, at 135.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The customer may be further limited from opening an account at another
bank, because "many banks refuse to open accounts for people whose previous banks have
closed their accounts." Id. at 136. Essentially, a customer may undertake a payday loan
and thereby go from being a "banked" customer to an "unbanked" individual, creating
further problems with the already precarious financial position of the borrower. Id.
145. Id. at 150.
146. Id. at 137. Professor Satz argues that these binding arbitration agreements "deny
the payday lending customer the opportunity to have her case heard in court and suggest
that the payday lending industry targets and takes advantage of entire classes of custom-
ers." Id.
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constitutional provision. As a threshold matter, it is critical to respond to
an important anticipated criticism. Because payday lenders do not em-
ploy their borrowers, some might argue that Thirteenth Amendment pe-
onage arguments do not apply in this context. This critique, however,
takes too narrow a view of peonage under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The lack of a literal employment relationship is inconsequential as the
court in Jaremillo v. Romero explained.' 4 7 The circumstances surround-
ing the loans render them coercive, and the loans are tied directly to the
debtor's paycheck. Furthermore:
[t]he fact that the debts may have been voluntarily incurred is irrele-
vant. The fact that the debtor may not be tied to a particular em-
ployer or type of work is also irrelevant, since the reasoning of the
peonage cases does not rest on the existence of a particular em-
ployer. Nor is such an order saved by its civil nature, since the keys
to the jail are found only in the coerced labor itself.'4 8
A. Peonage: Economically Trapped & Involuntary Serving Payday
Lenders
While payday lenders are not literally the debtor's employers, their re-
lationship is analogous to the typical employer-employee relationship
present in the peonage cases. The Thirteenth Amendment, the Anti-Pe-
onage Act, and multiple judicial decisions guarantee freedom from forced
labor to those trapped by indebtedness.1 49 The structure of payday loans
traps debtors in their indebtedness, forcing them into a cycle of never-
ending debt.'s 0 Payday loans are designed to maintain a borrower until
her payday, require the debtor to secure the loan with a post-dated check
or debit authorization, and are meant to be paid back in one lump sum
147. See generally Romero, 1 N.M. at 195-96 (explaining the endless cycle of debt
existing within the master-servant system in New Mexico around 1846).
148. Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. I.i_ L. Rev. 191, 234 (2009).
"Peonage is a type of involuntary servitude ... in which a debtor is forced through the
mechanism of physical or legal coercion to work in order to pay a debt. Id.
149. Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME- L. Rev. 165, 182 (1990). An analogous relationship exists
between the Thirteenth Amendment and bankruptcy, particularly in that bankruptcy pro-
vides a similar freedom from forced labor as do the anti-peonage laws. Id. Furthermore,
"[pJeonage and bankruptcy can be seen as analogous when bankruptcy coerces work
through imprisonment ..... Id.
150. Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 311. "The goal of these payday loans is to make it
next to impossible for consumers to have the ability to pay off the loan in full at the end of
the loan period without needing to borrow again before the next payday." Id.
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when the consumer receives her paycheck."' Thus, the debtor is quite
literally working off the debt for the payday lenders. Payday loans have a
direct relationship to the debtor's labor, and the fruits of her labor. Like
the court found in Jaremillo v. Romero, these loans hold a debtor until
she fulfills her debt and render her a laborer so long as the debt remains.
Threats of criminal prosecution for failing to pay back the debt are
unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, yet this does not stop
payday lenders."' The loan structure, issuing borrowers the loan via a
post-dated check, is another tool of coercion. 5 3 Payday lenders take ad-
vantage of the borrower's fears of prosecution and jail by threatening
customers with criminal prosecution for writing bad checks.154 Histori-
cally payday lenders threatened to present the wage assignment (now re-
placed by a post-dated check) to the debtor's employer, who could
terminate the debtor.15 5 Today, even if payday lenders cannot legally
prosecute a borrower, they still "use the criminal justice system as a col-
lection agency."' 5 6 Payday lenders possess "a strong economic incentive
to threaten customers with criminal prosecution. Payday loan customers
will do whatever it takes to keep from going to jail; thus, payday lenders
are assured of getting paid as long as consumers fear imprisonment.""
Furthermore, borrowing from payday lenders traps the borrower in a
cycle of debt and a coercive labor-for-debt relationship.' As Professor
Nathalie Martin points out:
151. See generally Martin, supra note 3, at 564 (explaining by example that a short-
term loan for $400 attaches a $100 fee, which on interest-only loans becomes a $100 inter-
est due every two weeks).
152. See generally Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 147 (exploring the illegality of threats to pros-
ecute used to force an individual into service, per the Thirteenth Amendment).
153, See Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 1. ECON. PERSe. 169, 169 (2007)
(explaining that in order to receive a payday loan, a borrower usually presents the lender
with a post-dated check). See generally Johnson, supra note 140, at 87 (stating that the
"available evidence shows that payday lenders threaten prosecution across the nation-
even in jurisdictions where governmental attorneys will not pursue bad-check convictions
against payday borrowers").
154. Johnson, supra note 140, at 86-87.
155. Martin, supra note 3, at 571 ("According to some, the payday lending industry
initially grew from the salary-buying business of the early twentieth century. Salary buyers
advanced cash at steep fees on the security of a wage assignment. If the loan was not
repaid or renewed on time, the salary buyer would threaten to present the wage assign-
ment to the borrower's employer, who might then terminate the employee.").
156. Johnson, supra note 140, at 96.
157. Id.
158. See generally Christopher Konneker, How the Poor are Getting Poorer: The
Proliferation of Payday Loans in Texas via State Charter Renting, 14 SCHOLAR 489, 494-95
(2011) (discussing components of the cycle of debt associated with payday lending). See
also, Molly McDonough, Payday Lenders Using Courts to Create Modern-Day Debtors'
Prisons in Missouri, Critics Say, ABA Journal, Aug. 20, 2012, available at http://www.aba
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[V]ery few customers can afford to pay back the loans. Rather ...
most customers find it necessary to continue to pay $1000 to borrow
$500 for twenty weeks, or to pay $100 in interest every two weeks-
for the rest of time-on an original loan of $400.159
Payday loan fees and interest hikes are other tools of coercion.' 60
Debtors, worried about mounting interest and the unpaid principals, must
work tirelessly just to keep up with payments .161 The thought of accruing
more debt under the terms of the loan is frightening to debtors, as many
of them spend their entire paycheck to keep up with the payments.
Although the initial decision to enter into a payday loan is generally
considered to be voluntary, the nature of the subsequent relationship be-
tween the lender and the debtor often becomes coercive. As Bailey clari-
fies, coercion can exist irrespective of whether a loan was entered into
voluntarily.' 62 Payday lenders often encourage repeat borrowing, and
borrowers often feel they must take out additional loans to keep up with
payments on a previous loan.'6 3
Furthermore, some payday loans are not even truly voluntary at the
outset." Individuals who utilize payday loans are disproportionately a
part of the underclass.'6 s Professor Randall Kennedy characterizes the
journal.com/news/article/payday-lenders-using-courts-to-create-modern-daydebtors_
prisons (showing that "[a] practice in Missouri of summoning debtors to civil court for an
'examination'is resulting in arrests and prompting critics to complain about modern-day
debtors' prison tactics in the state.").
159. Martin, supra note 3, at 577.
160. See, e.g., Stegman, supra note 153, at 169-70 (discussing payday loan fees and
interest rates).
161. See generally Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 311-12 (contending that mounting
interest makes it nearly impossible for borrowers to pay back the principal).
162. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911) (stating that "peonage, however
created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude).
163. Martin, supra note 3, at 575. See also Uriah King and Leslie Parrish, Payday
Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, Long on Debt, CENrER FoR ResroNsmus LENDINo, Mar. 31,
2011, at 2-3.
[R]epeated borrowing is a result of the structure of the payday loan product itself-
requiring a borrower to repay the entire amount due with a single paycheck virtually
ensures that they will not have enough money left over to get through the rest of their
pay period without quickly taking out another loan. Borrowers are misled by the
promise of a short-term credit product to take a loan that is designed to keep them
indebted for extended periods.
Id. at 1-2.
164. See Satz, supra note 12, at 133 (detailing the payday lending industry as one that
"targets communities in which individuals have little to no choice as to where to obtain a
loan. These individuals are, in effect, a captive audience.").
165. See generally Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 308. "Consumers who enter the
payday loan market 'are not even living paycheck to paycheck."' Id. They are "borrowing
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consequences of being poor as being particularly vulnerable to "terrors of
nature, bad luck and communal failure," and further argues that people
living in poverty turn to financial loans and payday lenders to meet basic
survival needS.16 6 Under contract law, a person who agrees to take out
another loan in order to make an existing loan payment and pay rent is
arguably under duress, as he or she is trying to prevent the potentially
devastating alternatives to not having that money.1 67 The creditor knows
the status of the debtor's credit,' 8 income, debt, and that the short-term
credit product is "harmful if used on a continuing basis."' 9 Payday lend-
against their next paycheck to meet living expenses. The market is structured around peo-
ple living below the middle-class in this country." Id.
166. Randall Kennedy, U.S.'s Deepest Fault Line, CENIER FOR Soc. COHESION, http://
cohesion.asu.edu/?p=536 (last visited June 28, 2012).
167. RESTATEMENT (FRsT) OF CONTRACIS § 493 (1932) (emphasis added):
Duress may be exercised by
(a) personal violence or a threat thereof, or
(b) imprisonment, or threat of imprisonment, except where the imprisonment brought
about or threatened is for the enforcement of a civil claim, and is made in good faith in
accordance with law, or
(c) threats of physical injury, or of wrongful imprisonment or prosecution of a husband;
wife, child, or other near relative, or
(d) threats of wrongfully destroying, injuring, seizing or withholding land or other things,
or
(e) any other wrongful acts that compel a person to manifest apparent assent to a transac-
tion without his volition or cause such fear as to preclude him from exercising free will and
judgment in entering into a transaction.
Id. The Restatement gives the following example for clause d:
A threatens to eject immediately B, a tenant at will who is ill and unable to find
another residence at once, unless B signs a lease at double the existing rent. B signs
the lease because of fear of immediate ejectment. If the rent demanded is unconscion-
able there is duress. Though A did not create the circumstances making dispossession
so serious a matter, oppressive use of these circumstances may amount to duress.
Id. The Restatement gives the following examples for clause e:
A, a banker, holds a note of B who has been discharged in bankruptcy. B needs
banking accommodations in order to carry on his business. A threatens B that unless
B signs a new note in substitution for the one held by A's bank, A will use his influ-
ence with all the banks in the neighborhood to prevent B from having banking accom-
modation. Induced by fear, B signs a new note. There is duress.
Id. Furthermore,
A, a creditor of B, threatens B to bring proceedings to have a guardian appointed for
B, and take charge of his property unless he will sign a note for A's claim. B is an
aged person of infirm will, and induced by fear signs the note. There is duress.
Id.
168. See Martin, supra note 3, at 572 ("[Lenders] assess a borrower's creditworthiness
using the industry-wide TeleTrack credit reporting system and then offer a loan through a
retail store location.").
169. Uriah King and Leslie Parrish, Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, Long on
Debt, CENTER FOR RESPONSIMLE LENDING, Mar. 31, 2011, at 1.
2012] 89
THE SCHOLAR
ers are indifferent to the dire financial situation of many borrowers, and
instead exacerbate such problems by making it next to impossible for bor-
rowers to pay back the loan.'70 In addition, lenders take advantage of
borrowers' fears of increased poverty or possible imprisonment by using
aggressive and inappropriate collection practices, which encourage debt-
ors to borrow even more.'
This is not unlike the defendants in Mussry who knew that their domes-
tic servants had no other recourse but to work for them.17 2 Lenders
know that the debtors are desperate, and struggling to stay afloat finan-
cially."' They use psychological tactics to coerce debtors into thinking
that their loans are the only way to stay financially ahead.
B. Payday Loans Perpetuate the Badges and Incidents of Slavery
Trapped by payday loans, a debtor's ability to escape her marginalized
economic and social situation is stunted-a valid Thirteenth Amendment
concern.' 7 4 Mobility is restricted, as it takes capital to move, and any of
the debtor's extra capital is dedicated to paying off these loans. Payday
lenders make most of their money from repeat debtors," which suggests
that borrowers' confinement to the debt cycle is not only financial, but
also geographical. Debtors cannot make important life decisions such as
170. See Mendenhall, supra note 101, at 311 (discussing the payday lender's intent to
put the debtor into a debt cycle).
171. See generally id. at 314 (stating that "collection practices used by payday lenders
are not imposed on consumers defaulting from traditional forms of credit").
172. See United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984) (deciding
that enticing Indonesian servants to travel to the United States and subsequently forcing
them to work off the debt incurred by transportation, was a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment, if proven).
173. See generally Johnson, supra note 140, at 63.
One research assistant obtained a total of nine loans in three days. Most of the
subsequent lenders asked why the researcher needed another loan so soon after the
previous one. In response, the research assistant gave various answers such as '[tihe
loan I got yesterday wasn't large enough,' '[m]y paycheck wasn't big enough,' and 'I
lost money gambling last night.' Even though Tele-Track informed these lenders
about existing payday loans, most granted the loans. With statements such as '[i]t's
none of my business,' some loan clerks ignored signs that a research assistant could be
a consumer in grave financial trouble.
Id.
174. Sidhu, supra note 14 (manuscript at 51). "[Dlenial of physical, or horizontal,
liberty . . . establishes a cognizable Thirteenth Amendment problem. The inability of
slaves to move beyond accepted boundaries or travel broadly was a fundamental part of
slavery." Id. at 53. "Accordingly, the Supreme Court recognized that 'restraint
of . . . movements' is an 'inseparable incident[] of the institution' of slavery that falls
squarely within the core of the amendment's original concerns." Id. at 54.
175. Martin, supra note 3, at 573.
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whether to move, get married, or change professions. The inability of
many payday loan borrowers to make such life decisions creates physical
isolation and indicates social and economic conditions that present Thir-
teenth Amendment concerns.
Geographic isolation only perpetuates payday borrowers' poverty and
lack of access to resources. Professor Sidhu writes, "Importantly, as a
result of their physical isolation and exposure to the conditions within
them, including inadequate public education, the probability of modest
economic success for the urban underclass is practically a foregone con-
clusion."" 6 Like "[tihe inability of slaves to move beyond accepted
boundaries or travel broadly was a fundamental element of slavery,"17 7
the payday debtor is unable to move out of his or her physical location to
another that may present better economic opportunities. A large part of
this isolation is due to the extreme debt the debtors find themselves in
because of payday lenders. This inability to move out of their physical
environment is reminiscent of a slave's inability to leave their master's
plantation."1 7
The argument for a minimum stake in society posited by Professor
Amar also calls for the freedom of movement. Physical immobility is "an
additional manifestation of the absence of a nominal stake in society that
the Thirteenth Amendment ensures, as the meaningful freedom of move-
ment is a precondition for participation in the modern economy."" 9 Fur-
thermore, debtors trapped by payday loans are not afforded the same
opportunities as those with a certain measure of economic wherewithal
(i.e., the upper classes), and thus do not have a minimum stake in society.
Payday debtors have negative capital that keeps growing negatively due
to the nature of the loan.18 o When the poor have a growing negative
capital, they become consumed with keeping up with payments, becom-
ing more and more dependent on payday loans.' 81 This economic depen-
dency, Professor Amar argues, is what the Thirteenth Amendment seeks
176. Sidhu, supra note 14 (manuscript at 45).
177. See id. at 53.
178. Id. at 55.
179. Id. Two main characteristics of the underclass are "their limited economic posi-
tion and [their] restrained physical situation;" both characteristics are legitimate Thirteenth
Amendment concerns. Id. See Amar, supra note 93, at 40 (stating that the Thirteenth
Amendment should be interpreted to "guarantee each American a certain minimum stake
in society").
180. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 10-11 (explaining that when a payday loan cus-
tomer cannot repay the loan, he or she must roll over the loan by paying a fee and thus
increasing the total cost of the loan).
181. See Id. at 56-57 (discussing that although a rollover is usually defined as "a cus-
tomer's payment of a fee to extend the payday loan's due date," the rollover definition
should also encompass the "borrowing from Peter and paying off Paul-that is, taking out
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to eliminate.' When the lower class does not have a minimum stake in
society, they are more vulnerable to suffering from the devices and inci-
dents of slavery.
In California alone, repeat African-American and Hispanic borrowers
spend $247 million in payday loan fees annually.' This takes money
away from their communities-money that could be spent on bills or
emergency costs, and to keep the borrower out of debt. The Center for
Responsible Lending found that payday lenders were about eight times
as concentrated in neighborhoods that were predominately African-
American and Latino as compared to Caucasian neighborhoods.' 84
Seemingly, payday lenders are taking advantage of the physical isolation
of poor minorities, perpetuating the badge of slavery identified in Jones-
herding minorities into ghettos and inhibiting their economic ability.""'
Moreover, the cycle of debt perpetuated by payday lenders is a huge
factor in keeping the underclass chronically disadvantaged. Because pay-
day lenders specifically target the underclass, especially the minority un-
derclass, they are exploiting the economic conditions this class lives
under.'8 6 Moreover, payday lenders actively work to keep the underclass
'"under," knowing poor people yield the highest profits for their lending
institutions."
a new loan from a different/second lender to pay off an outstanding loan previously ob-
tained from the first lender.").
182. Amar, supra note 93, at 40.
183. Wei Li et al., Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location
of Payday Lenders in California, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Mar. 26, 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/predatory-
profiling.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968); see also Sidhu, supra note
14 (manuscript at 39-40) (noting that the Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), restored, at least partially, "the broader vision of the Thirteen Amendment's
reach.").
186. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 100, construed in SHARON HERMANSON &
GEORGF GABERLAVAGE, AARP, TiiE AiI'ERNAIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUS'TRY 4
fig.4, 51 (2001), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/ib51_finance.pdf
(describing the target profile of payday lenders are primarily female-headed households).
Particularly, the American Association of Retired People (AARP) analyzed locations of
check-cashing outlets, over half of which offer payday loan services, and found that "low-
income and minority households are significantly more likely to have [check-cashing out-
lets] located within one mile of their homes than higher-income and nonminority house-
holds." Id. See also Satz, supra note 12 (indicating that payday lenders "know their most
profitable customer base--cash-strapped consumer with little financially savvy . . . .").
187. See generally Martin, supra note 3, at 575. "Lenders encourage employees to get
customers to take out as many new loans as possible . . . ." One former employee ex-
plained, "[wie were trained to encourage customers the day they paid a loan off to make
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V. CONCLUSION
The payday lending crisis is a symptom of a larger social mobility prob-
lem in the United States-regulating payday lenders will be a significant
step towards improving our nation's economy and creating a fairer econ-
omy for our poor. Upward social mobility in the United States has all but
become stagnant in recent years, and payday lenders profit from and pro-
mote this stasis. To illustrate, in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, between twenty-three and thirty percent of
sons and daughters born to fathers who were in the bottom fifth of their
country's earnings remained in the bottom fifth. 18  However, in the
United States, the same statistic rises to forty-two percent.' The U.S.
Census reported 46.2 million people were living in poverty in 2010, the
highest poverty rate since 1959.190
A lending industry that profits from a weakening economy and targets
the underclass as their most lucrative borrowers creates constitutional
consequences that must be addressed. The terms of these loans, the coer-
cive nature of the lenders, and the demoralizing and destructive conse-
quences for the borrowers reflect exactly what the framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment sought to eliminate. A line can be drawn to dis-
tinguish payday loans from other types of loans. Historically, loans have
not been interest-only loans.' 91 Not every loan presents the issues of pe-
onage and promotion of the badges and incidents of slavery as a means of
greater income. Payday loan consumers must be protected. These loans,
at the very least, must be regulated to do away with the involuntary servi-
tude they create.
Seventeen states have already effectively banned payday lenders. 92
Continuing this trend would solve this constitutional issue most effec-
another loan as early as the next day. We tried to get customers to keep getting loans and
borrow up to their maximum approval amount whether they wanted it or not." Id.
188. Scott Winship, Mobility Impaired, NAr',. Rev. OMNI,, (Nov. 7,2011,4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/282292/mobility-impaired-scott-winship.
189. Id. See also ORG. FOR ECON. Co-ovERATION AN) DEV. (OECD), A FAM Y
AFFAIR: INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL Mo3urry AcRoss OECD COUNTRIES 6 (2010),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/7/45002641.pdf ("[Ejxisting estimates of the
extent to which sons' earnings levels correlate with those of their fathers . . . find persis-
tence to be particularly pronounced in ... the United States. . . .").
190. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER IN POVERTY AND POVERry RATE: 1959 io 2010,
Figure 4 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/incpovhlth/
2010/figure4.pdf.
191. See Peterson, supra note 120, at 1111 (stating that historically, "all but a small
minority of states have capped interest rates on loans to consumers . . . ," while during the
past twenty years the payday loan market has become highly unregulated).
192. Online Payday Loans Come With a High Price (CBS television broadcast Sept.
26, 2011), available at www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7382455n. See also Josh Baugh,
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tively. Until all states safeguard borrowers from payday lenders, federal
involvement is appropriate and the Thirteenth Amendment is, as demon-
strated, a proper federal mechanism for Congress to use in regulating
payday lending.
There is a danger in not recognizing the Thirteenth Amendment issues
payday lenders present. There is essentially a caste in American society
that has extremely limited economic opportunity, no political stake in
their community, and is socially isolated. This raises serious Thirteenth
Amendment concerns. Payday lenders trap an already vulnerable group,
keeping them tethered to the dire economic situation that they live in,
while profiting from it.
There is a solution already in place in our Constitution. The Supreme
Court has never struck down Congress when exercising its Thirteenth
Amendment powers. The Thirteenth Amendment is the vehicle that
Congress should use to regulate payday lenders. Instituting federal usury
caps would halt triple digit interest rates in this country, and provide legal
protection for the poor.'93 Placing a national usury cap' 9 on these types
of loans would be a huge step toward preventing the cycle of debt payday
lenders promote. Borrowers would still have the opportunity to borrow,
but the impossible interest rates that act as a strangle-hold on debtors
would not be a part of the loans.
There is a broader danger if Congress fails to act on this Thirteenth
Amendment problem. If Congress does not recognize and remedy the
fact that these lenders are preying upon underclass in America, they fail
to recognize that the underclass is a viable part of our economy and our
society that deserves the same protections as those who already have a
minimum stake in society. The underclass will continue to be dis-
empowered, and will continue to suffer from the badges and incidents of
slavery.' 95 If our country allows payday lenders to continue to profit
from the underclass because of their economic, political, and social isola-
Councilman Wants to Curtail Predatory Lending Practices, SAN AroNmo ExPlress Ne-ws,
June 13, 2012, www.mysanantonio.com/news/localnews/article/Councilman-wants-to-cur-
tail-predatory-lending-3628770.php (stating that at least twelve states have banned payday
lending while others have limited the amount of the loans).
193. Federal usury caps would protect the poor from online payday lenders as well as
payday lending shops in their neighborhoods.
194. Usury is defined, "historically, [as] the lending of money with interest;" and "to-
day, [as] the charging of an illegal rate of interest as a condition to lending money.
BLACK's LAw DicrIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Usury also refers to "[a]n illegally high rate of
interest." Id.
195. See Amar, supra note 93, at 53 ("The absence of such opportunity to advance
economically, vertically, and thus the absence of the baseline conditions necessary for
meaningful participation in society, can provide the basis for a legitimate grievance under
the Thirteenth Amendment.").
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tion, our country is not only approving these predatory, practices, but
saying that it is acceptable for the underclass to be shackled to their place
in society, and that it is acceptable for payday lenders to profit from their
suffering.
Finally, to allow payday lenders to continue preying on the underclass,
to allow them to continue making loans that de facto enslave borrowers,
is to allow them to act without regard for the purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment, for it is an act taken against democracy, against the dignity
of the toiling millions, against liberty, the peace, the honor, the renown,
and the life of the nation.19 6
196. CONG. Giom, 38-m CONG., 1sT SESS. 1320, 1324 (1864).
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